Introduction:

The right to privacy remains one of the most crucial yet consistently undervalued rights in Nigeria. Both the government and the citizenry in various occasions have, over time, failed to give this right the recognition it inherently deserves. This fundamental liberty is repeatedly confronted across various facets of human life and interaction. Presently, it finds itself at the heart of a contentious debate regarding the vehicle tint permit regulations imposed by the Nigerian Police Force regulations that have generated significant legal, constitutional, and philosophical concerns.

This paper seeks to critically examine the constitutionality of such tint regulations through the lens of privacy, human dignity, and the limits of state power in a democratic society.

Understanding the Right to Privacy:

Privacy, in the context of this discussion, is the right of an individual to be free from unjustified, unsolicited, and unauthorized surveillance, observation, or interference. It encompasses the ability to seclude one’s person, space, information, and possessions from public scrutiny or government overreach[i]. It guarantees individuals a sphere of personal autonomy where they can act, think, and exist without unnecessary intrusion.

The High Court of Lagos State, in a landmark decision, defined privacy as “the presumption that individuals should have an area of autonomous development, interaction and liberty, a private sphere with or without interaction with others, free from arbitrary state intervention by other uninvited individuals.”[ii]

Building upon this, legal scholar Olomojobi[iii] asserts that privacy is a shield for individual affairs from the prying eyes of the public, and by extension, the state. It is not a luxury; it is a necessity for dignity, autonomy, and the exercise of other fundamental rights

Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) expressly provides that:

“The privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.”

This right was not just created by international treaties, nor did it originate from Acts of parliament. Rather, it is an inherent, pre-existing right, one that the Constitution does not just merely recognizes and affirms.

The Divine and Natural Foundations of Privacy:

In my considered opinion, this right is divine. It is one of the earliest rights exercised by humankind, as illustrated in the biblical account of Adam and Eve.

According to the Christian Holy Bible, Adam and Eve, upon realizing their nudity, instinctively sought to hide themselves and covered their bodies with leaves, a profound expression of the innate human need for privacy. The scripture goes further to reveal that God, recognizing and respecting their need for covering, made garments of animal skin for them. This singular act can be interpreted as a divine endorsement of the inalienable right to privacy, what may be termed the "right of covering."

Humanity’s enduring desire to protect its privacy has since evolved into physical innovations. From building houses with opaque walls, doors, and roofs, to manufacturing cars with body structures and tinted windows each innovation reflects a pursuit of this fundamental right. Yet, ironically, in modern Nigeria, a citizen must now seek government permission in the form of a “tint permit” to exercise this basic right of covering.

Privacy, Human Dignity, and Liberty:

Privacy is an indispensable element of human dignity and personal liberty. It protects individuals’ decisions regarding family life, religion, movement, security, and even health.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in  Pierce v. Society of Sisters[iv] reinforces this point. The Court invalidated a law that compelled children to attend public schools, affirming that “the child is not the mere creature of the state” and that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions regarding their child’s education. This is a powerful reminder that the government does not own the citizen and cannot dictate every facet of private life.

Similarly, in the Nigerian case of Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v. Okonkwo[v], the Supreme Court of Nigeria emphasized the right of individuals to personal autonomy and privacy, especially regarding medical decisions. The Court held that “the right to privacy and dignity of the human person precludes unwarranted intrusion into one’s body or life.” This principle should be applied with equal force to matters of vehicular privacy.

Conclusively, the imposition of vehicle tint permit regulations in Nigeria is not only unconstitutional it is unjust, intrusive, and undignified. It undermines the very essence of the right to privacy, transforming what is supposed to be an inalienable liberty into a privilege that must be purchased or approved by the state.

This form of regulation reflects a broader tendency of state institutions in Nigeria to prioritize control over constitutionalism. It criminalizes privacy and treats ordinary citizens as suspects until proven innocent an approach that contradicts both the rule of law and democratic values.

The Nigerian state must urgently revisit these policies and enact clear, rights-respecting legislation that balances national security with civil liberties. Until then, the tint permit regulation stands as a violation of Section 37 of the Constitution and must be challenged, resisted, and ultimately struck down.

To cover oneself should not require permission. Privacy is not a concession from the state it is a right from birth, and indeed, from creation.

[i] O Babalola ‘The constitutional origins of the right to privacy in Nigeria’ (2025) 1 African Journal on Privacy & Data Protection 83-97

[ii] Unreported Suit LD/14895MFHR/2023 between Olumide Babalola and Oyinlola Adebayo delivered by Hon Justice OA Oresanya (Mr) on 13 February 2024.

[iii] Y Olomojobi ‘Right to privacy in Nigeria’ in OBabalola & KOkwujiako (eds) Emerging jurisprudence on privacy and data protection in Nigeria (2023) 3.

[iv] 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 

[v] (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 206 SC,